The Two United States: Why Federal Law Doesn't Apply To You
The United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution of the United States are constitutional republics. The United States, by way of the Congress of the United States, has certain powers delegated to it by the Constitution. So far as the several States party to the Constitution are concerned, the United States may not exercise power not delegated by the Constitution. All power not delegated to the United States by the Constitution is reserved to the several States within their respective territorial borders, or to the people.
However, Congress is solely responsible for governing territory belonging to the United States. This authority is conferred at Article I, Section 8, clause 17 (Art. I § 8.17) and Art. IV § 3.2 of the Constitution. The responsibility for governing territory belonging to the United States is vested solely in Congress, it is not shared by the other two branches of federal government. Congress has absolute or what is described as plenary power - municipal power, police power, etc.
So far as its role as government for the several States party to the Constitution is concerned, the United States is an abstraction - it exists on paper only. It takes on physical reality after Congress positively activates constitutionally delegated powers through statutes enacted in accordance with Art. I § 7 of the Constitution. When statutes are in place authoring administrative or judicial activity, the "power" of the United States becomes manifest through people carrying out duties prescribed by law Congress has enacted.
The second physical aspect of the United States is constitutionally delegated authority to own land and other property. The only specific mention and direct estate is at Art. I § 8.17 of the Constitution, which specifies that the Congress may acquire land for the seat of government, and for forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. States in which these land purchases are made must cede jurisdiction over the lands in order for the United States to extend federal laws and judicial authority over them.
When the United States acquires land, and secures jurisdiction over it, the United States becomes a geographical entity. In other words, after Congress [acquired] the present District of Columbia from Virginia and Maryland, and the two state governments ceded jurisdiction, the United States became a geographical entity. The geographical United States within the framework of Art. 1 § 8.17 of the Constitution includes the District of Columbia, and all forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings within the several States.
There is a second class of territory belonging to the United States that existed when government of the United States convened under the Constitution in 1789. This was territory claimed by the several States by way of the treaty of peace with Great Britain following the American Revolution. The land ceded by King George extended from the Great Lakes on the north to the Atlantic on the south, except for Florida - approximately everything from Illinois to Mississippi and Alabama. States of the Union ceded lands beyond their respective original borders to the United States in order to generate revenue to pay debts accumulated by the Revolution, with the condition that as they were settled and developed, the territories would become states of the Union.
Prior to these lands being admitted to the Union, they were territories of the United States. Under provisions of Art. IV § 3.2 of the Constitution, Congress is charged with responsibility for making all needful rules and regulations for territories belonging to the United States. Therefore, Congress has historically established territorial governments, providing for law enforcement, courts, and everything else necessary for a territory to operate in an orderly fashion.
The first venture in this enterprise was framed by the Ordinance of 1787, providing for government of the Northwest territories. The United States was at that time operating under the Articles of Confederation. In 1789, when government of the United States convened under the Constitution, the Ordinance of 1787 was adopted as an existing covenant obligation, and was subsequently extended to Kentucky, and as applicable, to southern territories - Alabama and Mississippi included. The Louisiana Purchase from France, and subsequently acquisition of Florida from Spain, included treaty agreements to incorporate the land and people under the constitutional scheme, so the Ordinance of 1787 was applied as the development guide in acquired territories as well.
This
pattern held until after the Spanish-American War. Islands ceded by
Spain in 1898 were not incorporated in the constitutional scheme. In
1901, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that while Puerto
Rico and other islands ceded by Spain belonged to the United States,
they were for certain purposes foreign to the several States and
incorporated territories of the United States.
From the
beginning, there were certain distinctions between the Union of States
party to the Constitution and territories of the United States. For the
most part, outlying territories were reasonably primitive, so many were
first secured under military authority, then went through an evolution
that progressed to representative government to development sufficient
for self-rule. At that point, most territories established their
respective constitutions and were admitted to the Union on equal
standing with other States party to the Constitution.
Texas and California were two exceptions. Texas became an independent republic following the war of independence from Mexico, then joined the Union by way of treaty. Some time after Mexico ceded California, California became a state of the Union without formally going through territorial status. However, this has not been the case for islands ceded by Spain following the Spanish-American War and other island acquisitions other than Hawaii. With admittance of Hawaii and Alaska in 1959, the last of the incorporated territories of the United States became states of the Union, leaving only unincorporated territories, called insular possessions, under Congress' Article IV plenary power.
In
1946, the Philippines became an independent commonwealth, exiting the
family of United States insular possessions. In 1953, Puerto Rico became
a commonwealth for purposes of local government, something on the order
of states of the Union, but remained an insular possession of the
United States subject to Congress' Article IV authority.
There
are a total of five larger United States insular possessions with viable
local governments, four of which have courts of the United States:
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa. The latter doesn't have a federal court. Smaller
insular possessions are for the most part uninhabited, or at best,
sparsely populated, or small enough that populations aren't truly viable
small islands, reefs, etc. None are incorporated in the constitutional
scheme, although Puerto Rico in particular has addressed the possibility
of becoming a state of the Union.
After
about 1870, Congress began reserving land for the United States within
borders of new states admitted to the Union. This land fell within two
classes: Unappropriated public lands, most of which was designated as
national parks, forests, etc.; yellowstone National Park was the first,
and lands secured in trust for Native American Indians, most of which
was used to establish reservations.
The current geographical
United States includes the District of Columbia and federal enclaves
where jurisdiction over forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other
needful buildings has been ceded by the several States respectively;
lands retained in States admitted to the Union since approximately 1870;
and insular possessions, along with territorial waters (12-mile limit,
established under international law).
The
geographical division determines Congress' power: Congress may exercise
constitutionally delegated power, primarily under Art. I § 8 of the
Constitution, throughout the "American empire". This is Congress'
"general power".
Congress exercises the combined power of state,
national, and even local government in territory belonging to the United
States - in the "geographical" United States. This is Congress' special
or limited jurisdiction.
Within the
Union of several States, Congress may exercise only constitutionally
delegated authority; within the "geographical" United States, Congress
may exercise all power not explicitly or implicitly prohibited by the
Constitution. Congress' general powers delegated by the Constitution are
restricted to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution;
Congress' special plenary power is permissive, limited only by implicit
and explicit constitutional prohibitions, but may be exercised only in
territory belonging to the United States.
Congress' authority in
and over the geographical United States is somewhat on the order of a
European government where what we understand as national government in
the American system is also state government. Where existing insular
possessions are concerned, there is also the distinction that the
Constitution applies to them only as Congress chooses to extend it.
Governing principles are more under international than constitutional
law.
This notion was first judicially
framed by Chief Justice Marshall in an 1828 decision involving an
incident in Florida while Florida was yet a territory of the United
States.
The Constitution extends authority for Congress to
declare war and make treaties. It also delegates authority for Congress
to establish new states.
Although the Constitution is silent with respect to acquisition of new territory beyond borders of existing States, and implicitly bringing territories ceded by original States into the Union, these powers were construed to extend territorial acquisition authority, and vest Congress with authority to govern and determine disposition of acquired territory. Following the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Jefferson drafted proposed amendments that would authorize incorporating Louisiana and other future states included in the Purchase into the constitutional scheme, but Congress elected to proceed without an amendment. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court in 1828, was put in a position of having to rationalize a quarter century of territorial development. In the Article IV framework, he stepped from strict constitutional construction into the forum of international law. Thus, federal government found a capacity beyond strict constitutional restrictions. There was a whole separate world to be explored, and subdued, beyond constitutional bounds.
To the point of the
Spanish-American War, there was an amount of solace for incorporated
territories of the United States, as well as the Union of several
States: Once the Constitution has been extended to a territory, it
cannot be retracted. The Ordinance of 1787 provided an amount of
protection as it specifies that people of the territories were assured
of common law and due process in the course of the common law, along
with most other rights secured in the first ten amendments to the
Constitution. But unincorporated territories did not enjoy these
assurances.
Insular possessions have gained an amount of ground
by way of compacts and agreements, but remain outside the constitutional
scheme. Virtually all of them are subjected to "due process in the
course of the civil law" (admiralty/maritime), and remain within Coast
Guard jurisdiction.
With the history of
United States territorial acquisition and development in place,
Congress' distinct roles, and distinction between the Union of several
States and the geographical United States, are reasonably clear. With
this in mind, the reason precious little federal law applies to the
Union of several States and people of the several States will be easier
to grasp. The underlying theme - "Follow the money!"
Article I §
8.5 of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "to coin
Money, regulate the Value thereof…" and at Article I § 10.1, stipulates
that, "No State shall … make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts …" At Article I §8.6, Congress is granted
power, "To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting and Securities
and current Coin of the United States…"
There
has been no constitutional amendment to alter these provisions. They
remain as firmly in place today as they were in 1789. Yet there is
precious little gold and silver coin in the United States or the Union
of States - none in general circulation.
An old story has it that
a woman once found her husband with another woman, but rather than
panic, the man calmly got out of the bed, slipped on his clothes,
straightened himself up, then asked the wife, "Are you going to believe
me or your lying eyes?"
Does the Constitution mandate gold and silver coin as the national currency? Monetary theories and rationalization are irrelevant. Either the several States are prohibited from making any thing but gold and silver coin a payment for debt or they aren't. Authority to "coin" money and prescribe punishment for counterfeiting "current coin" of the United States pretty well locks the matter down. Either the several States are prohibited from making any thing but gold and silver coin a payment for debt or they aren't. If this prohibition lies against the States, it follows that American founders intended for Congress to provide gold and silver coin as a uniform monetary system. In fact, George Washington and others threatened not to attend the Constitutional Convention if the notion of a federal paper currency was going to be considered. The fact that minting gold and silver coin of the United States was immediately implemented speaks to the matter - the first Congress, so far as possible, carried out constitutional intent.
There was, however, an early glitch. Congress chartered a national bank. Money powers were waiting at the gate from the beginning. That experience soured, so the charter for the first national bank was terminated shortly after the turn of the century. Then a second was chartered. Andrew Jackson put an end to the second in 1836 when he vetoed the bill that would have renewed the charter. Jackson's reasoning was simple: The Constitution does not delegate authority for Congress to establish a national bank. Jackson's rationale has never been seriously challenged, and the Constitution has never been amended to authorize Congress to establish a national bank. Nor, for that matter, does the Constitution delegate authority for the United States to establish corporations, particularly private corporations.
Development
in these areas came primarily during and after the Civil War. National
banks were established in territories of the United States, but no
central or national bank was established. Many of the nation's railroads
were also chartered and incorporated in territories, so were and are
United States corporations. The underlying rationale is simple: Where
territory of the United States is concerned, Congress has permissive
rather than restrictive power - Congress can do anything not explicitly
or implicitly prohibited by the Constitution.
One of the things
entrenched powers wanted was authority to print paper money, and by way
of paper, to create credit. The Supreme Court held out on this mater as
late as 1880, but in 1884, the court almost completely reversed with the
Julliard decision - the Constitution does not expressly prohibit
Congress from printing paper money.
It
does, however, prohibit the several States from making any thing but
gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt, and the court
generally upheld this prohibition through the balance of the nineteenth
century when states such as Washington demanded payment of taxes in gold
and silver coin.
Generally speaking, United States paper money
was accepted and honored as it was backed 100% by gold. It was more
convenient with respect to weight and bulk, and it had other advantages,
particularly as silver coin became less plentiful.
In 1913, Congress chartered the Federal Reserve System as a national bank of sorts. Federal Reserve banks provided several advantages, not the least of which was giving United States government access to ready credit created out of thin air. With authority to create credit, Federal Reserve banks could effectively manufacture money - or what appeared as money. From 1914 to 1933, United States paper money issued in conjunction with Federal Reserve banks went from 100% backed by gold, to 40% backed by gold and the other 60% backed by obligations of the United States. Dilution of the currency dramatically increased money in circulation, which resulted in inflation, and partially fueled the speculative period producing the 1929 equities collapse.
The
three basic mechanisms the Federal Reserve uses to control credit and
money supply, with all "money" generated through credit issue, are as
follows: The percentage of reserve required on deposit by member banks;
open window discount rates (interest charged to member banks, mostly
Federal Reserve Banks); and the basic discount or interest rate. Through
these mechanisms, the Federal Reserve maintains "hard money" or "soft
money" policy, either shrinking or expanding credit and money supply and
thereby regulating the overall economy. Through these mechanisms the
Federal Reserve can single-handedly collapse the nation's credit and
monetary systems, or if there is perceived benefit, such as an election
year might be, nurse a sick economy along. This is hardly the regulation
of value the Constitution delegates to Congress.
If the
Constitution hasn't been amended, United States paper money (Federal
Reserve [bank] Notes), and the Federal Reserve System, must be creatures
of Congress' Article IV authority in the geographical United States.
The Constitution says what is says - it hasn't been amended either to authorize the several States to make anything other than gold and silver coin a tender for payment of debt, or authorizing Congress to take absolute control of the nation's economic activity. Consequently, there can be but one conclusion: The Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve [bank] Note are legitimate, or have legitimate authority for use, only in the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction -they are creatures within the scope of Congress' special rather than general authority.
There is far more to the credit and monetary scams than will be treated here since the purpose at hand is to demonstrate proper application of federal law rather than to address any given subject. It should be obvious, however, that once fraudulent credit and monetary systems predicated on Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative authority were in place, it was necessary to move all or nearly all of United States government under the same authority. Where the federal tax system is concerned, that was done via the revenue act of November 23, 1921 - virtually all taxes promulgated under Congress' Article I and Sixteenth Amendment authority were repealed. When they were reenacted, they came back in under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction. No taxing statute in the current Internal Revenue Code (Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large), as amended in 1986 and since, evidenced in title 26 of the United States Code) reaches the several States and the population at large. The taxes apply in three general categories: Income tax, Social Security tax, and the like apply only to agencies and employees of the United States; most other taxes, including inheritance, gambling, alcohol, tobacco, etc., are applicable only in the geographical United States; and some taxes cross over to customs duties.
One of the ways to determine
geographical application of any given statute or act is by way of
definitions contained in the act. For example, the Buck Act, which
allegedly extended authority of "States" to tax on federal territory
within a "State", is a classical red herring. The Buck Act is reproduced
in sections 105-111 of Title 4 of the United States Code. The term
"State" is defined at 4 USC § 111(d), as follows:
(d) The term "State" includes any Territory or possession of the United States.
Compare
the above definition to the one in the act that authorized the several
States, and eventually federal territories and the like, to enter
cooperative agreements relating to crime. The original act was
promulgated in June 1934, then the basis for the current form was
reenacted in May 1949. It has been amended several times since, but no
major revision since Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union. The
definition is at 4 USC § 112(b):
(b) For the purposes of this
section, the term "State" means the several States and Alaska, Hawaii,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of
Columbia.
There are several different
principles of law that govern interpretation of the two definitions of
"State" set out above, but probably the more concise is "Inclusio unius
est exclusion alterius", defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition,
as follows:
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The
inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of
one person is an absolute exclusion of all others. Burgin v. Forbes,
293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d, 321, 325. This doctrine decrees that where law
expressly describes particular situation to which it shall apply, an
irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was
intended to be omitted or excluded. Kevin McC v. Mary A, 123 Misc.2d
148 N.Y.S.2d, 116, 118.
The definition of "State" at 4 USC § 111(d) clearly applies only within the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction - Congress' "special" or limited jurisdiction. Therefore, the Buck Act does not apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution as they are not territories or possessions of the United States. All examples in the definition are of federal territories. When the definition employs the term "includes", it can be expanded only to the class, not anything outside the class demonstrated by example. Since 4 USC § 111(d) does not mention the several States, and does not name any of the several States as a class example, "[they were] intended to be omitted or excluded."
One the other hand,
4 USC § 112(d) specifically includes the several States along with the
District of Columbia, incorporated territories and insular possessions
of the United States. This particular statute is the underlying
authority for uniform laws relating to extradition, detainers, etc.
Congress has legitimate constitutional authority to make these kinds of
uniform rules, and this is one of the few acts classified in the United
States Code that appears to issue under Congress' general legislative
power.
Now consider corresponding applications found in Rule
54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Per authority of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules, delegated at 28 USC § 2072, any
statute in conflict with the rules is automatically repealed, so the
following applications govern Title 18 of the United States Code, which
is entitled, "Crimes and Criminal Procedure":
"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.
"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to
and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory
or in an insular possession.
Given the Latin principle above, it
is clear that these applications do not extend to the Union of several
States party to the Constitution. They address only real estate under
Congress' Article IV § 3.2 municipal authority. Therefore, little or
nothing in title 18 of the United States Code applies to the Union of
several States and the population at large. Since all other penalty
statutes in the United States Code fall back on Title 18 for procedure,
the conclusion can be made that few if any criminal statutes classified
in the United States Code are applicable to or within the several States
except in federal enclaves such as military installations and national
parks.
At 18 USC § 5, the "United States" is defined as follows:
§5. United States defined
The term "United States", as used in this title in a territorial sense,
includes all places and waters, continental and insular, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, except the Canal Zone.
There
we find the word "territorial" - the territorial or geographical United
States. The territorial United States is subject to Congress' Article
IV § 3.2 plenary power - the combined power of state and national, and
in some instances, local government. The United States definition above,
which is controlling for Title 18 of the United States Code, has
application limited to territories and insular possessions of the United
States.
Another clear clue is in the catchline for the Title 18
jurisdiction section, § 7: "Special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States defined". The section defines eight
jurisdictions, none of which apply to the several States beyond borders
of federal enclaves. No jurisdiction defined in Title 18 reaches the
Union of several States party to the Constitution.
It
is also important to understand that Congress can enact laws applicable
exclusively within Article IV § 3.2 jurisdiction that fall within
Article I delegated power, but not exercise the Article I power for
general application. This is basically what happened following
across-the-board repeal of excise taxes via the revenue act of November
23, 1921. Excise tax with general application were legitimate under
Article I § 8 delegated authority, but when they were reenacted, they
were promulgated under Congress' special authority within the
geographical United States.
To see this, consider definitions of interstate and foreign commerce at 18 USC § 10:
§ 10. Interstate commerce and foreign commerce defined
The term 'interstate commerce", as used in this title, includes
commerce between one State, Territory, Possession, or the District of
Columbia and another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of
Columbia.
The term "foreign commerce", as used in this title, includes commerce with a foreign country.
The
term "State" must have the definition or application set out in Rule
54(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in order to maintain
consistency and agreement: "'State' includes the possession." Examples
in the 18 USC § 10 definition of interstate principle set out above
governs: That which was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted
or excluded.
The Federal Register Act provides a convenient test
for the allegation that Title 18 of the United States Code is applicable
only in the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV §
3.2 municipal authority. Of particular import, 44 USC § 1505(a)(1)
stipulates that all "Presidential proclamations and Executive Orders,
except those not having general applicability and legal effect or
effective only against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as
officers, agents, or employees thereof," must be published in the
Federal Register. The subsection concludes, "For the purposes of this
chapter every document or order which prescribes a penalty has general
applicability and legal effect."
The
legalese mumbo-jumbo is designed to make understanding as difficult as
possible, but the mandate for publication of delegations of authority,
regulations, etc., is articulated in Note 16, 44 U.S.C.A. § 1505, by the
following decision:
The Administrative Procedure Act, § 551
et seq., of Title 5, and this chapter [44 USC §§ 1501 et seq.] require
publication, irrespective of actual notice, as a prerequisite to
issuance of a regulation making certain acts criminal. Hotch v. U.S.,
1954, 212 F.2d. 280, 14 Alaska 594 [insert added for clarity]
There
are no regulations (see Code of Federal Regulations titles) for Title
18 of the United States Code. Therefore, by terms of the Federal
Register Act, there can be only three applications of penalty statutes
classified in Title 18 of the United States Code: They can apply to, (1)
agencies and officers, employees and agents of the United States, (2)
territories and insular possessions of the United States, and (3) United
States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. All of the applications, or
jurisdictions, are special in nature. Congress' authority to regulate
government, and to define and punish piracy and other offenses on the
high seas, are Article I § 8 delegated powers, but the special
territorial jurisdiction falls under Article IV § 3.2 municipal
authority.
There is yet another erroneous fly in the ointment to
be examined: Virtually all civil litigation and criminal prosecution by
government officials is in the name of the "United States of America",
not the "United States".
This detail
cannot be overlooked. The Constitution of the United States, as the
Articles of Confederation before, vests authority in the governmental
entity designated as the United States. Article I § 1 of the
Constitution vests legislative authority in the Congress of the United
States; Article II establishes the President of the United States; and
Article III vests judicial authority of the United States in the supreme
Court of the United States and whatever inferior courts Congress might
establish. The Tenth Amendment prohibits the United States from
exercising power not delegated by the Constitution.
The "United
States of America" is an historically significant name. Article I of the
Articles of Confederation established the several party States as the
United States of America, and the people of the United States of America
established the Constitution of the United States (Preamble). But each
of the several States is sovereign within its borders except for powers
delegated to the United States by the Constitution. The people of this
nation have vested no authority in a governmental entity known as the
"United States of America", and state and national constitutions do not
delegate authority for officers of the several States and the United
States to unilaterally establish a new national power.
Resolving
the mystery of who or what the "United States of America" is somewhat
like walking through a house of mirrors, but two conclusions can be
drawn from available evidence: (1) the United States of America is a
governmental entity foreign to the United States, and (2) the United
States of America is a geographical entity.
The first capacity of
the Assistant Attorney General is found at 28 CFR, Part 0.55. At Part
0.55(b), the delegation order specifies that the Assistant Attorney
General will conduct, supervise, or handle, "Cases involving criminal
frauds against the United States…," and at Part 0.55(s), the Assistant
Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
is required to conduct, supervise, or handle, "Civil proceedings in
which the United States is plaintiff…" In other words, the "United
States" is principal of interest in the basic delegation of authority
for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
However,
at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-1, the delegation to the Assistant Attorney
General over the Criminal Division authorizes him to serve as agent for a
distinctly separate entity, the "United States of America." The
delegation also authorizes him to redelegate this authority to Deputy
Assistant Attorney's General in the Criminal Division, or to the
Director and Deputy Directors of the Office of International Affairs,
Criminal Division. The entire delegation order, as it appears in the
Code of Federal Regulations, is as follows:
The Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division shall have the
authority and perform the functions of the "Central Authority" or
"Competent Authority" (or like designation) under treaties and executive
agreements between the United States of America and other countries on
mutual assistance in criminal matters which designate the Attorney
General or the Department of Justice as such authority. The Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, is authorized to redelegate this
authority to the Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Criminal Division,
and to the Director and Deputy Directors of the Office of International
Affairs, Criminal Division.
In order to
establish that the "United States of America" is a government or some
other form of entity foreign to the "United States", it is not necessary
to prove the precise who, what or where, it is only necessary to prove
that the United States of America is separate and distinct from the
United States. The above delegations of authority to the Assistant
Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
do that - Part 0.55 establishes his capacity in relation to offenses
against the United States; Part 0.64-1 establishes his capacity as agent
for the United States of America. They are clear and distinct
capacities. Therefore, the United States of America is a government or
political compact established under treaties and executive agreements
which is foreign to the United States; whether geographically or in the
sense that a donor heart is alien and foreign to a heart transplant
recipient.
Delegations to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons
are even clearer. The Director and his officers (wardens) are authorized
to (1) imprison people convicted of offenses against the United States,
(2) accept and imprison prisoners transferred from the United States of
America, and (3) accept and imprison prisoners transferred from the
District of Columbia. District of Columbia prisoners will not be
considered in this context.
The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons relating to offenses against the
United States is at 28 CFR, Part 0.96, reproduced in relative part:
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is authorized to exercise or
perform any of the authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed
upon the Attorney General by any law relating to the commitment, control
or treatment of persons (including insane prisoners and juvenile
delinquents) charged with criminal offenses against the United States…
The Director's capacity as agent of the United States of America is at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b:
§ 0.96b Exchange of prisoners
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons and officers of the Bureau of
Prisons designated by him are authorized to receive custody of offenders
and to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America
under a treaty as referred to in Public Law 95-144; to make arrangements
with the States and to receive offenders from the States for transfer
to a foreign country; to act as an agent of the United States to receive
the delivery from a foreign government of any person being transferred
to the United States under such a treaty; to render to foreign countries
and to receive from them certifications and reports required under a
treaty; and to receive custody and carry out the sentence and
imprisonment of such a transferred offender as required by that statute
and any such treaty.
The delegation order
above clearly distinguishes between the United State of America and the
United States. The Director and designated officers, wardens, are
"…authorized to receive custody of offenders … from the Untied States of
America …," and "to act as an agent of the United States to receive the
delivery from a foreign government of any person transferred to the
United States under such a treaty …" Once the Director and his
designated officers receive custody of offenders from a foreign
government, they become agents of that government by carrying out the
sentence imposed by the foreign government.
This bit of "hide the
truth with legalese mumbo-jumbo" becomes clearer via the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act (Pub.L. 91-538, Dec. 9, 1970, 94 Stat. 1397
et seq.). In section 2 of the Act, the United States and the District of
Columbia are made parties to the agreement:
The Interstate
Agreement on Detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into by
the United States on its own behalf and on behalf of the District of
Columbia with all jurisdictions legally joining in substantially the
following form:
In Article II (a) of the Act, the "United States of America" is defined as a "State":
"(a) 'State' shall mean a State of the United States; the United States
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; the
District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."
Delegations
of authority at 28 CFR, Parts 0.55, 0.64-1, 0.96 and 0.96b, and the
above cites from the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act clearly
demonstrate the two critical elements: The United States of America is
an entity defined by act of Congress as a State, which means it is
geographical and territorial, and it is a government foreign to the
United States.
Finally, the "United States of America, ss,
President of the United States", is principal of interest in courts of
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (48 USC §§ 874 & 1406f), and
probably other United States courts in the larger insular possessions,
those being located in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. There is
no statutory authority authorizing the "United States of America" as
principal of interest in courts of the United States situated in the
Union of several States party to the Constitution. In fact, it is
reasonably easy to demonstrate that all civil and/or criminal actions
prosecuted on behalf of the United States of America in United States
District Courts presume admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
territorial United States District Court of the Virgin Islands.
Where
this discourse serves the limited purpose of demonstrating that
precious little current federal law applies in and to the Union of
several States, and people of the several States, whether citizens or
aliens lawfully admitted to the several States, it isn't necessary to
address motive beyond what is necessary to assist with understanding,
and accepting, why elected and appointed public servants left
constitutionally delegated authority behind to exit through the Article
IV § 3.2 loophole, then establish a nonconstitutional government entity -
a political compact or alliance - foreign to the United States.
Motive
is ages old - the lust, and greed, for wealth and power. For the first
time in history, the alliance behind the scheme is postured for true
global conquest. But the conquest is without authority of law.
Perpetrators must step beyond constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
authority in order to impose what is glibly described as private
international law - a system which is slightly more subtle in means, if
not effect, than methods employed by Vandals to sack the Roman Empire.
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